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Introduction 
The society we envision is rooted in the power of a little plant, 
which against all odds, and against all "rationality," makes its 
way up through the cracks in a cement sidewalk. Scientists 
working on plant roots tell us now that this little plant, left on its 
own, could grow a network of roots from Toronto to Vancouver. 
This is also the power of the rhizome, a rootlike, usually horizon-
tal stem that grows under or along the ground, and sends out roots 
from its lower surface and leaves or stalks from its upper surface. 
It can be cracked and broken at any point, it starts off again 
following one or another of its lines. 
The "ecological imperative" and the increasing perception of 
an ecological crisis are changing the way we see the planet and 
the place of human beings in the biosphere. Within the scientific 
community, there is a growing process of questioning reduc-
tionism, mechanicism and atomism, the pillars of the still 
hegemonic scientific worldview; and there are many serious 
attempts to create a scientific project which takes its metaphors, 
methods and guiding principles from living organisms. This 
process represents a most profound attack upon the ideological 
cement that sustains this civilization, the received scientific 
worldview which has became nothing less than the dominant 
religion of modernity. 
This emerging reformulation of science is finally paying 
attention to those lonely scholars (like de Santillana, Harshorne, 
Whitehead, Leopold, Heiddeger, and others) who warned earlier 
in this century about the dangers of anthropocentrism and of the 
hegemonic scientific discourse inherited from the Scientific 
Revolution. Philosophers, artists and spiritual figures had 
sounded in the West the alarm warning of the dangers of seeing 
"man" at the centre of the universe and at the pinnacle of natural 
evolution. Old biocentric streams of thought in the East and 
among native peoples had told us the same earlier still. This 
recovery of an old wisdom and its emergence from within 
science is a very exciting process that promises deep cultural 
implications. 
We would like to illustrate this idea, discussing how the 
ecological imperative has subversive implications for the social 
sciences. We will present our argument briefly, reflecting upon 
the inevitable changes required in our understanding of social 
power, that mysterious network of relationships and veritable 
web of roots through which circulates so much that is vital for 
human beings. 
Our global society has finally come to recognize the environ-
mental crisis as the main concern in humanity's agenda. This is 
an immense step forward. With it, we may have begun to recover 
an understanding of the inseparability of human beings and 
nature. The war in the Persian Gulf is of course, a brutal reminder 
that the corporate-industrial-bureaucratic-military machinery of 
death (that rules East and West) will remain deaf, blind and 
suicidal vis-a-vis the suffering of living beings and the demands 
of the biosphere. 
The ecological crisis (that is, the human recognition that human 
action is threatening the integrity of the biosphere) may lead to 
a total reformulation of the ways we study society and the ways 
we understand social power. 
From the perspective of an ecological sensibility, social power 
cannot continue to be understood as a purely inter-human prob-
lem: nature intervenes not only providing all the "resources" 
upon which human society is built and reproduces itself; it 
provides all the "other" relations upon which human meaning 
and identity are shaped. 
Social scientific literature discussing social power forgets that 
the energy and the information (that is, the poetry, the music, and 
the conversation) with which nature talks to us, is the source of 
everything that keep society alive, that flows as meaning through 
our nervous systems, our minds and hearts, after being actively 
elaborated to constitute the "stuff of social life out of which 
power relationships emerge. In this sense, nature is the ultimate 
source of social power. That the biology of our cognition is an 
active, creative, self-organizing, purposeful ("autopoietic") 
process does not change, but rather, reinforces the influence of 
the rest of nature in the conversation with humans. The biosphere 
with all its creatures, its forms and landscapes, colours and 
climates, intervenes actively and permanently through all our 
lifespan in the conversations between human beings, setting 
constraints and possibilities, and contributing to our socializa-
tion. It is an inseparable thread of the fabric of any culture. 
This simple realization leads us to affirm that social power 
cannot continue to be understood only in terms of the control and 
use of resources, that is, in terms of the capability to impose one's 
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will upon others through the control of material resources, of 
decision-making processes of knowledge and its dissemination, 
of socialization, and of punitive resources and coercive institu-
tions. This notion of social power and "success" is at the source 
of many of our current environmental problems. 
In the conventional view of social power, the society, group, 
or individual managing to harness more energy-matter from 
nature appears as the most successful, the "fittest." If modern 
society is the expression of this "fitness," the "successful" adap-
tation of the human species will end in replacing the biosphere 
with a parking lot where no life will be possible. 
Thus, for example, the U.S., with a mere five percent of the 
world's population, uses over thirty percent of all material 
resources, and is seen as the most successful, the most evolved 
and most powerful society in the world (and certainly, this is the 
view most Americans have of themselves). However, from the 
perspective of an ecocentric ecological sensibility, it can well be 
seen as the weakest, the most needy, the greediest, and the most 
energy-sugar-and-drug-addicted society on earth. It represents 
a way of life that is responsible more than any other for the 
current process of destruction of life-supporting "systems." The 
unprecedented amounts of energy, matter and information har-
nessed by the U.S. and all the industrialized world, runs parallel 
with an unprecedented concentration of all dimensions of con-
ventional social power, and an unprecedented destruction of life. 
It has become an immense vacuum-cleaner, sucking energy 
resources and wiping out life, biodiversity and cultural diversity 
in an increasingly accelerated process of cementification and 
plastification of the world, triggering also as a by-product the 
population exploding in the Third World. It is at the roots of 
peoples' hunger and poverty, in which the Third World's 
transnationalized elites actively cooperate. 
According to some estimates (Max-Neff, 1982), each U.S. 
citizen is equivalent to some fifty Latin American peasants, 
evolved in the subsistence economy, in terms of the consumption 
of "resources" extracted from nature resources that we, further-
more, distribute in ways that increase the gap between the rich 
and the poor in the U.S. This is something to be mindful of in 
debates on population. 
The U.S. in particular and the West in general (and their way 
of life actively imitated by urban middle and higher classes in 
the Third World) represent the locomotive that pulls our modern 
world "train" of direction, down the hill, apparently without 
brakes. 
The view of power as synonymous with the harnessing of 
increasing amounts of energy from nature, must be counter-
balanced by a notion of power as successful "tuning-in" to the 
constraints and possibilities established by the biosphere. (We 
felt the temptation of writing about this notion of power as 
successful "adaptation in nature," but this would also require us 
to change the meaning of the notion of "successful adaptation," 
which has become synonymous with reproductive success"). 
This notion of power as successful "tuning-in" to nature 
emerges from what we consider to be the central dilemma of our 
modern industrial civilization: the sharp conflict between the 
development of what has been called "productive forces," on the 
one hand, and the concomitant destruction of the conditions that 
make all life and the "productive process" possible, on the other. 
Thus, our concern is not centred on the eventual depletion of 
energy resources life oil and coal, but rather on the broader and 
more complex phenomenon of the destruction of all the condi-
tions that make life, including human life, possible. 
One fundamental key to this is the notion of an "ecological and 
social sustainability" as a morality which must accompany an 
ecological sensibility, since both deligitimize possessive in-
dividualism. It leads also, fundamentally, to the introduction of 
a clear distinction between "productive" and "destructive" for-
ces, a distinction that conventional economics has failed to make. 
"Productive forces" in our view, are only those whose final 
products, can be returned to the biosphere, without endangering 
its stability, sustainability and diversity, or the reproduction and 
recuperation of life in general. "Destructive forces", have as their 
final products material and social "substances" which, returned 
to nature, lead to the extinction of living species and diminish 
the biodiversity essential to life. This essential distinction need 
not lead to the cessation of growth but rather, to a clarification 
and transformation of the answers we give to such questions as 
"what to produce", "how to produce it," "for whom to produce 
it," and "who will own or control what?" Ultimately, we need to 
concern ourselves with the question of preserving and recreating 
biodiversity. 
If the central concern of our productive activities becomes the 
protection and recovery of biodiversity, we may witness a deep 
transformation of all our social institutions, for such a central 
concern must ultimately be founded on social diversity. The 
ecological imperative may lead to the gradual dismantling and 
replacement of all high-entropy institutions, because they are 
ecologically maladaptive, weak rather than powerful: the nation 
state, the military, and the multinational corporation may need 
to be replaced by low-entropy institutions. Contributing to the 
conception of a sustainable society (which is not the same thing 
as "sustainable development"), and articulating a vision of the 
transition to it, are the most challenging and significant intellec-
tual tasks of our epoch. The alternative may well be a post-human 
biosphere. 
If the establishment of ecological sustainability as a morality 
is fundamental, even more so is the type of experience that leads 
people to expand their self (not their ego) towards full identifica-
tion with nature, that is, towards an ecological sensibility. We 
fully agree with A. Naess when he insists that "we need not say 
that today man's relation with the nonhuman world is immoral. 
It is enough to say that it lacks generosity, fortitude, and love" 
(1982:315-16). And "...perhaps we should in environmental 
affairs primarily try to influence people towards beautiful acts. 
Work on their inclinations rather than morals." (quoted in Fox, 
1990:220). This idea is not new: it corresponds to the ways 
human societies of gatherers and hunters made sense of the 
world. 
The long history of human society - not the last three hundred 
years, but the more than 100,000 years of Homo sapiens -- is 
rich in lessons for us; these come mainly and more often from 
the "weak," the people who rooted in nature, knew (and know) 
so much of what we are beginning to discover. The doctrine of 
progress and the idea of evolution have, in fact, helped to repress 
the memory of the long history of the human race, as much as 
childhood memories are repressed in adults' conscious lives. As 
we know today, both conscious and unconscious are sources of 
profound wisdom. 
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The Human Need for Hope 
We recognize that the previous section of this article has a 
strong Utopian flavour. Its "realistic" character though, is 
provided by its firm advocacy of biodiversity and cultural diver-
sity, something that is often missing in Utopian views. Although 
the paper is an expression of our own need for hope, we want to 
interrogate ourselves about what it is that motivates this 
widespread urge, an urge that appears in so many cultures and 
in so many historical epochs. 
The need for hope permeates many religious, artistic, 
philosophical and cosmological expressions, but we will use the 
Utopian propensity as an illustration. 
Our interest focuses here on the human tendency to imagine 
and to create societies in which human beings could satisfy their 
needs and attain happiness, as defined in each case by the creator 
of the Utopia. To call an idea "Utopian," or to neglect it simply 
as the fruit of somebody's imagination, with little correspon-
dence to reality does not answer the question of why it was 
necessary for the Utopianist to imagine something better in the 
first place. 
We assume that the creation of Utopias is historically, cultural-
ly, and ecologically conditioned. Thus, we realize that different 
cosmologies open or close the space for the creation of Utopias, 
depending on whether or not they recognize efficacy in the 
intervention of human will in the shaping of social reality. 
However, it seems that the Utopian phenomenon also shows a 
transhistorical and transcultural dimension: imagining a life of 
total happiness, and a society constituted in ways that make it 
possible, seems to be part of the battery of human resources with 
which we face pain and suffering. The Utopian phenomenon 
could be seen then, also, as an expression of the human capacity 
to ensure the flow of life, in direct reference to forces pushing 
towards life or towards its negation. The Utopian inclination and 
the unfolding of hope could be seen as compensatory and balanc-
ing flows of energy which oppose and, at the same time, contain 
entropic tendencies. 
We recognize, however, the dangers inherent in the Utopian 
phenomenon, its authoritarian potential, and the historically 
recurrent dissonances between the conception of Utopias and the 
attempts to carry them out. We also realize that intellectual 
rejections of Utopias as irrational, such as are found in scientific 
literature, also become a kind of Utopian phenomenon themsel-
ves. History inevitably selectively filters Utopian propositions, 
producing totally unexpected combinations and movements and 
generating new cultural scenarios. 
If a cosmology based on human mastery over nature 
strengthened the Utopian propensity in the West, it nevertheless 
generated its opposites. Many Utopian worldviews envisioning 
harmony between humans and the natural world share many 
elements present in other cultures, which, in spite of their low 
production of Utopias, displayed (many until today) exactly the 
same need for collective hope. As R. Levitas (1984) points out: 
Many, if not most, societies have some kind of myth of an 
earthly paradise, and, in spite of variations, these reveal a 
number of similarities. Their content revolves around com-
mon human concerns of survival, aging, pain and death, with 
an emphasis on abundance and physical ease. Many 
mythological paradises have clement weather and abundant 
food and water but also contain a tree of life, a source of 
eternal youth, a substance with miraculous powers of healing. 
Such themes occur in the biblical account of Eden and in the 
Celtic tales of the Isles of the Blessed, and recur in modern 
fiction. (Levitas, 1984:19). 
To envision a life of total happiness and a society built in a 
manner along the lines that can make this vision real is, then, an 
inseparable ingredient of human life. It seems to be a part of the 
battery of resources with which humans face pain and suffering. 
Whether the world of happiness is a golden past to be recreated 
or remembered, or a future to be attained, does not matter for this 
particular discussion. 
Happiness cannot exist without reference to anguish and 
suffering, paradise without reference to hell, Utopia without 
reference to dystopia. It is the realization of the desperate human 
need of imagining something better than anguish which creates 
the drive for hope. The loss of paradise, hope or Utopia repre-
sents (at least in the West) the disappearance of meaning; depres-
sion and even suicide, and makes life impossible. 
We cannot see the Utopian impulse only as an escape from 
"reality;" "reality" is not "something" in between anguish and 
hope, horror and ecstasy. Human reality is also made out of these 
"materials," for they represent the extremes of human existence: 
life and death. If this is acceptable we have to admit that social 
reality goes beyond knowledge, because nobody has the capacity 
to perceive the phenomenal immensity of life contained in the 
totality of myths and Utopias, in dreams and events, in art, 
religion, philosophy and material production, in falsity and truth. 
These are all fragments of the broken mirror of "reality." If we 
were able to put together all the pieces of this puzzle (which, 
reflecting "light," actively contributes to the construction of 
reality), we would gain access to "truth." But this is beyond the 
ability of our minds. 
Then, it is hard to conceive of a "reality" devoid of the 
borderlines of horror and ecstasy, of the invisible immensity of 
the cosmos and the bits of happiness and pain of daily human 
life. If these are the materials or our "real reality," is it not 
appropriate to see the Utopian impulse, the setting in motion of 
hope as a particular manifestation of life, of the sparkling 
obscurity that leads our bland desire for total happiness? Utopia 
seen from this light is simply the normal flow of the principle of 
life (unless we see human reason as a sort of "genetic" error of 
the constant trials of nature, an "error" destined to be corrected 
by its eventual disappearance). 
The idea of Utopia as expressive of the human equipment of 
adaptation to ensure the flow of life can be illustrated with 
reference to entropy and syntropy (or "negative entropy"), to 
death-enhancing and life-enhancing phenomena. This perspec-
tive of Utopia cannot but be very speculative. The idea here is 
to see the Utopian impulse, the unfolding of hope, as a compen-
sating and balancing flow of energy, that, actively elaborated in 
the human cognitive process, becomes meaning which opposes 
and simultaneously contains entropic tendencies. This perspec-
tive does not appear explicitly articulated in the literature on 
Utopia that we have reviewed, but one can find many hints of it 
in the works of L. Mumford, T. Roszak, M. Bookchin, and 
several authors with a "deep ecological" sensibility. 
It is precisely through inquiring into the explanatory power of 
thermodynamics that J. Wagensberg (1984) approaches, in a 
stimulating essay, the question to Utopia. Although at this stage 
of elaboration the contribution of this author does not transcend 
the attempt to find in the language of thermodynamics and 
information theory some concepts with explanatory value, the 
exercise remains useful. 
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Wagenberg's starting point is Paul Tillich's consideration of 
the idea of Utopia as a phenomenon in which opposing values, 
positive and negative, coexist. The former consists of the truth 
of Utopia (the essence of human existence), its fertility (the 
Utopian anticipation of ways to follow) and its power (it offers 
the strength to produce changes. The latter, the negative one, is 
its falsity (Utopia forgets human finiteness), its sterility (it 
presents as possible the impossible) and its powerlessness (be-
cause it leads to frustration). Both these elements inhabit Utopias 
and act with and against their creativity. In Tillich these forces 
are opposed; their results can have one or another sense or 
outcome, but they are both guaranteed. Utopia, then, is useful 
because it ensures a situation of imbalance, of non-equilibrium, 
which is the minimal state of any living system. 
According to Wagenberg, the thermodynamic meaning of a 
"system in balance" is absolute homogeneity and uniformity. 
This is, in particular, the state to which all isolated systems tend, 
whose environment forbids any exchange of matter, energy and 
information with the rest of the universe. As explained by the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics, any isolated physical system 
will proceed spontaneously in the direction of ever increasing 
disorder, expressed mathematically as "entropy" (from energy 
and "tropos," the Greek word for transformation or evolution). 
Thus, entropy is a quantity that measures the degree of evolu-
tion of a physical system. According to the Second Law, the 
entropy of an isolated physical system will keep increasing, and 
because this evolution is accompanied by increasing disorder, 
entropy can also be seen as a measure of disorder. Wagensberg 
illustrates the idea comparing a fish swimming in the sea with a 
fish conserved in a can. In the latter state all points of the body 
are at the same pressure and temperature, nothing flows through 
it and nothing is exchanged with its exterior. The canned fish is 
as eternal as its isolation permits. It is an isolated, uniform and 
homogeneous system. The opposite in the case with the fish 
swimming in the sea: it is a living system, in constant exchange 
with its environment. 
In Wagensberg's elaboration, Utopia is referred to as a living 
system (human ensemble, society) and it is in open interaction 
with its environment, its evolution being the outcome of changes 
in such interactions. Or, we may suggest, the human being and 
his/her society constituting "open systems," one could see the 
Utopian impulse as part of the adaptative equipment of humans 
to their environment, to counteract entropic tendencies. Still, 
one could add another speculation: single Utopias act over the 
mainstream of society as natural expressions of the diversity and 
complexity of all living systems, and represent an adaptative 
capability. However, Utopias often represent ideas of highly 
uniform, homogeneous societies. That is, Utopias also contain 
in themselves the seeds of entropy. Although Wagenberg's 
argument does not elaborate on the ideas we suggested above, 
we share his conclusion: that the emergence of a new Utopia 
follows a crisis, resulting from the imposition by the environ-
ment of violent conditions that require not only adaptation but 
"self-organization,") that is, a state of internal organization of the 
system in rebellion against the conditions imposed by the en-
vironment. Since systems are not stable, any fluctuations can 
grow until they pull the system into a new state. This is the ability 
of nature to create "authentic novelties" (Wagensberg, 1984). 
L. Mumford also looks at this particular dimension of the 
Utopian phenomenon, that is, its quality as belonging to the 
complex system of adaptation of all living systems. Mumford's 
enterprise is by no means an attempt to glorify the Utopian 
impulse. His study of the problem looks at history for ex-
planatory clues. His excursion through history shows the ugly 
destiny of many wonderful exercises of human imagination. His 
conclusion is a dramatic warning. 
All ideal models have this same life-arresting, if not life-
denying property: hence nothing could be more fatal to 
human society than to achieve its ideals. But fortunately, 
nothing is less likely to happen, since as Walt Whitman 
observed, it is provided in the nature of things that from every 
consummation will spring conditions that make it necessary 
to pass beyond it...An ideal pattern is the ideological 
equivalent of a physical container: it keeps extraneous 
change within the bounds of human purpose. With the aid of 
ideals, a community may select, among a multitude of pos-
sibilities, those which are consonant with its own nature or a 
promise to further human development...But note that a 
society like our own, committed to change as its principal 
ideal value, may suffer arrest and fixation through its inex-
orable dynamism and kaleidoscopic novelty no less than a 
traditional society does through its rigidity. (Mumford, 1979: 
244). 
Wherein lies the danger of Utopias, materialized often in forms 
that completely deny the dreams of those who envisioned them 
in the first place? One characteristic of Utopias seems to be the 
uniformity of such projected societies or the existence of univer-
sal agreement or prevailing values as a precondition for the 
Utopia's fulfilment. Universal agreement does not necessarily 
mean that Utopias cannot in some ways be democratic. Universal 
agreement can be enforced and manipulated - as it is for Orwell 
- or it can be spontaneous - as in some of the 18th century 
Utopian writers. Universal agreement means, by implication, the 
absence of structurally generated conflict: this lies the very 
perfection all Utopias strive for, and here is also their main 
weakness. For the illusion of a Utopia's eventual materialization 
forgets a fundamental characteristic of human beings: our lack 
of consistency, our inability to live in absolute accordance with 
any system of values permanently and constantly; the human 
mind (particularly in societies emphasizing the efficacy of 
human will) is restless and unpredictable, constantly desiring 
novelty, and shaken by unforseen discoveries. 
A good example of the above problem can be found in 
Skinner's Utopian attempt. In his Utopian novel Walden Two, 
this author puts in the mouth of Frazier, the creator of the Utopian 
colony, the following words: 
I deny that freedom exists at all. I must deny it or my program 
would be absurd. (Skinner, 1948:214). 
Skinner seems to go out of his way to say that freedom is only 
another name for behaviour not understood, that freedom is 
normally expressed as madness, impulse or disobedience. Skin-
ner seems to assume that the success of his enterprise requires 
the end of democratic government and its replacement by an 
entirely planned process of socialization. The inhabitants of 
Skinner's Utopia are plain and nice, they work well and like to 
listen to serious music. They are polite enough; they are devoid 
of harshness and fanaticism. They have no spirituality, no dis-
guises, no indirectness, no playfulness or humour. Skinner's 
creatures have no inner life. Yet, his model of society requires a 
certain state of mind, a certain consciousness perceived by the 
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author as the higher expression of lucidity. And as in any other 
idea of society based on a supposedly lucid minority's claim of 
exclusive wisdom, we find here the seed of authoritarianism, the 
claim to authority that decides what is in the genuine interests of 
society, and decides this even against its own wishes. 
Together with the idea of an homogeneous society, whose 
members are the embodiment of enlightenment, comes a third 
danger: Utopian authors do not provide an answer to the question 
of how to attain the desired society; that is, there is no appropriate 
theory of transition from our current state of affairs into the ideal 
state. And whenever the attempt has been made, the result is 
characterized by the need of an vanguard (a charismatic leader, 
a group of enlightened members of an enlightened community, 
a revolutionary party a la Jacobin or Lenin). The vanguard must 
then somehow inoculate its consciousness into the backward 
masses, or strive to create a transitory dictatorship to set in place 
practices of socialization that will overcome the general state of 
"false consciousness." Moreover, the more the institutions of 
Utopia succeed, the more they determine the minds of its mem-
bers, and the fewer possibilities exist for furthering creative and 
purposeful change. 
A fourth fundamental problem of Utopias stems out of the 
previous considerations: the attainment of Utopia requires a 
social situation devoid of social conflict. Since more often than 
not social conflict is seen (by "lucid" minorities) as the result of 
one fundamental contradiction that must be solved in order to 
build the Utopian society (i.e., social regulation preventing the 
"free hand" of the market to perfectly allocate resources; the 
existence of a given type of relations of property; the domination 
of one class over the rest of society; the domination of one gender 
over the other; of one ethnicity over all others; etc.) what follows 
is the belief that the overcoming of the "main" contradiction or 
oppression will lead to the elimination of all others. The result, 
then, would be a society free of social conflicts. 
However, whenever there is social life, there is social conflict. 
It is not the presence but the absence of social conflict that is 
surprising and abnormal. Conflict does not need to be violent, 
uncontrolled or catastrophic. Social conflict can be temporarily 
suppressed, regulated, channelled and controlled, but not 
abolished altogether. Human societies are held together simul-
taneously by conflict and consensus. Further, conflicts arise 
always on the fields of shared values: for example, for a class 
conflict to exist, it is necessary that both workers and capitalists 
consensually share an appreciation for the appropriation of 
surplus. Without this consensus, there is no conflict. 
In fact, human collectivities express simultaneously both types 
of behaviour. Every society is held together by a given set of 
shared assumptions displayed in the background of deep-seated 
values that shape the collective identity: this is the historical role 
of cosmologies. However, within any society there is always 
social conflict accompanied by mechanisms to regulate and 
prevent it from becoming catastrophic. These mechanisms cor-
respond to a given manner of establishing intellectual and moral 
leadership in the society. Deep cultural transformation always 
requires a deep change in the most widely shared assumptions 
of a given society, something that happens only when the pre-
viously existing system of meaning fails to provide guidance in 
overcoming problems that threaten it with social disintegration, 
and that could prevent the survival of the given society. 
Another dimension emphasized by authors describing the 
dangers of Utopia is its paralysing effect. K. Popper (1948) 
believes that Utopias are malignant, dangerous and self-destruc-
tive, and that humankind would be better off tackling concrete 
evils rather than attempting to pursue an abstract good. However, 
his approach cannot lead but to a very narrow, piece-meal social 
engineering that, in our view is a form of surrender to the dictates 
of "empirical reality" as defined and manipulated by the cultural 
hegemony of a given model of science (mechanicism, reductionism, and atomism); such an approach prevents even the 
imagining of a potentially different reality. Without the Utopian 
dream, the achievements (and problems) of the democratic 
revolution could never have been accomplished. Neither could 
we imagine today ways out of the ecological crisis. And although 
nothing guarantees that we will find those ways, without the 
wildest mobilization of our ability to hope and to imagine a 
preferred world, we will never rediscover our place within 
nature. 
Ideas in history never advance in pure form and in a straight 
line. From the perspective of an ecological sensibility, we are 
certainly "out of track", and our civilization in all basic respects 
has much to learn from the way hunting and gathering societies 
managed to live tuned-in within the constraints and possibilities 
and the cycles of the biosphere. Those that still remain, are (in 
spite of the devastating impacts that they are receiving from the 
megamachine of industrial power) sources of deep wisdom. 
Human action can be inspired and strengthened by the Utopian 
impulse, and although a Utopian model can never materialize in 
its totality, the waves of history appropriate selectively and fulfil 
many Utopian ideals through complex and convoluted proces-
ses. Hope does not ensure anything, but without it our tragic 
species may be already doomed. 
Just one year ago, we felt full of motives for hope and 
optimism: a worldwide movement of democratization the defeat 
of authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe and in several Third 
World countries, was accompanied by a process of demilitariza-
tion and the transcendence of the Cold World mentality. The 
legitimacy of the machinery of death was in question. The world 
was talking about the planet. Environmental concerns were 
impregnating the consciousness of all peoples. "Glasnost" and 
"Perestroika" in Eastern Europe appeared as processes of the 
diffusion of social power, the opening up of public space, greater 
transparency in social relations, unilateral disarmament, new 
possibilities for the environment and peace, and all of that 
without (until then) violence. 
We do not know if the project of radical democracy represented 
one year ago by M. Gorbachev and his then allies has been 
already totally defeated. The picture of inter-ethnic violence 
chauvinism, and the reactivation of the machinery of death in the 
USSR no longer appears to be very inspiring. However, we are 
persuaded that a vision of radical democracy in Eastern Europe 
and elsewhere, needs to be articulated with ecological wisdom 
if it is to resist a re-concentration of power this time, perhaps not 
in the hands of the bureaucratic minority controlling the state, 
although this remain a possibility, but in the hands of the Western 
mega-machine and its transnational military- industrial-cor-
porate power structure. 
As hundreds of thousands of bombs kill innocent civilians 
victimized by the thirst for power and self-aggrandizement of 
blind leaders in the West and the Middle East, and as millions of 
animals, plants and marine organisms are killed for the control 
of resources, we need more than ever the mobilization of hope 
and the power of life. The voice of a movement of green, 
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democratic, non-violent, pacifist solidarity must be heard louder 
than ever. 
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